Frederich A. Rauch’s Psychology; or a View of the Human Soul


Introduction

Frederick Augustus Rauch’s Psychology; or, a view of the Human Soul; including Anthropology (1840) is remembered primarily because it was the first book on Hegelian psychology to be published in English and the first book published in the United States with the word “psychology”—as opposed to “mental” or “intellectual philosophy”—in the title.1 The book should also be remembered, however, for its importance in the development of American intellectuals’ interest in German idealism, especially the philosophy of Hegel. It has been said that, “An enthusiastic Hegelian, [Rauch] was probably the first bearer of Hegel’s teaching to America.”2 Unfortunately, Rauch did not live long enough for his intellectual talents to attain full maturity, nor did he publish enough for us to draw precise conclusions about the quality of his mind or the direction in which his thought was evolving. Nevertheless, in the following I shall attempt to provide a glimpse of Rauch as a person and a brief analysis of his thought.

Rauch was born in 1806 in Kirchbracht, Germany, approximately thirty-five miles northeast of Frankfurt.3 He was the son of a minister of the Reformed Church, Heinrich Rauch. His mother, Fredericke Karoline Rauch, who died within a fortnight of his birth, was the daughter of a minister of the Reformed Church. Frederick’s father delayed his son’s formal education, apparently because of the boy’s poor health, but at age twelve he entered the Gymnasium at Hanau, where, for three years, he studied classical languages and literature and displayed significant intellectual ability. For reasons we do not know, Rauch transferred to the Gymnasium at Büdingen where he continued his study of the classics for two more years. Upon completion of his Gymnasium education, Rauch continued his study of classical literature at the University of Giessen and, apparently to appease his father, he “devoted some time to the study of sacred letters.”4 Despite his father’s apparent aspirations, at this time Rauch hoped to pursue an academic career in philology. After three years at Giessen, at age twenty, he accepted a position as teaching assistant at Hadermann Institute in Frankfurt, a school for boys that was founded and directed by Konrad Ludwig Hadermann, Rauch’s maternal uncle.

Soon after Rauch began his duties at Hadermann, he initiated an effort to obtain a doctoral degree, which began the most trying chapter of his rather brief life story. Rather than petition the University of Giessen for a doctorate, Rauch sent letters to two universities he had never attended, Heidelberg and Marburg. The fact that he petitioned two universities may indicate that he had doubts about his prospects at either one. Rauch submitted a treatise, In Sophoclis Electram Observationes, to the philosophical faculty at both universities as evidence of his scholarly merit.5 It seems that Rauch pressed his case most vigorously at Marburg, where he explained to the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy that his uncle was in very poor health and hoped that his nephew would be academically qualified to assume the directorship of Hadermann Institute as soon as possible. Partly because of this personal exigency, the Philosophical Faculty at Marburg decided it was sufficiently impressed with Rauch’s treatise to grant the doctorate after he made some minor revisions to the introduction, paid the requisite fees, and submitted one hundred printed copies. Within a week of receiving this good news from Marburg, Rauch received a letter of rejection from Heidelberg, but soon thereafter Marburg granted him the doctorate, which was officially conferred on 6 March 1827.

Despite all these machinations, Rauch never assumed the directorship of Hadermann Institute, and less than a year after he received the doctorate, in December 1827 he entered the University of Heidelberg as a philology student. Six weeks later, Rauch petitioned the Heidelberg faculty to habilitate as a Privatdozent, an unsalaried lecturer, in philology, submitting the doctoral treatise they had rejected less than a year before in support of the petition. Rauch’s petition placed the Heidelberg faculty in a difficult predicament. Although Rauch had made minor revisions to the treatise, the Heidelberg faculty was still not impressed with it, but if they refused Rauch’s request they risked insulting the Marburg faculty who had granted him the doctorate. The Heidelberg faculty sought to handle the situation as inoffensively as possible by claiming that Rauch had received the doctorate only formally and not as a result of actual study at Marburg, and by noting that they had already engaged a Privatdozent and expected another shortly, both of whom had studied at Heidelberg. Nevertheless, the Heidelberg faculty offered to consider the petition favorably if Rauch would submit to an oral examination. Rather than accept this offer, Rauch resubmitted his petition, this time going over the heads of the faculty directly to the academic senate who, to Rauch’s disappointment, fully supported the prior decision of the faculty. It is noteworthy that in this second petition Rauch requested permission to lecture in philosophy rather than philology. I shall return to the issue of the shift in Rauch’s intellectual interest when we discuss his Psychology. For now I shall simply note that because of the manner in which he had pursued his petition, Rauch found himself increasingly ostracized at Heidelberg and abandoned his efforts there.

Rauch returned to Giessen in November 1828, where he was admitted to a philosophy seminar in philology under Professor Osann, and where he passed an oral examination and was provisionally habilitated as Privatdozent. Rauch’s habilitation was provisional because he had received the doctorate in another state, Electoral Hesse, and thus the faculty’s decision was subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Interior of Great Hesse. As a student at Giessen, Rauch worked diligently on a post-doctoral treatise in philology, but he soon came under criticism from Professor Osann, so severe that it threatened to destroy his professional prospects. Believing that the attack was motivated primarily by personal bitterness, Rauch filed suit against Osann in the civil court of Giessen. After an unfavorable decision from the court, Rauch took his case to the High Appellate Court, which remanded it back to the lower court for reconsideration. Ultimately, Rauch’s legal maneuvers brought the case to the attention of the Ministry of the Interior, who ruled that the Appellate Court was out of order and which was now wary of granting official status to his habilitation at Giessen. Nevertheless, Rauch’s petition to habilitate was approved by the Ministry of the Interior on 28 April 1830, but it is difficult to say why. Perhaps the Ministry was impressed by the three treatises Rauch had managed to publish in the midst of these battles, the titles of which can be translated as The Identity of Hindu, Persian, Pelasgian, German, and Slavic as Expressed in Language, Religion, and Customs (1829), Lectures on Goethe’s Faust (1830), and The Clarification of the Universe or the Determination of Mankind (1830). Howard Ziegler suggests that the Ministry and the faculty of Giessen recognized that approving Rauch’s petition would only grant him a Pyrrhic victory as he would then have to compete publicly against other Privatdozenten in an atmosphere so poisoned by these disputes that he could not possibly triumph.6 Although it might be tempting to judge Rauch harshly on the basis of what we know about these struggles, in truth, our knowledge of the details is fragmentary. Regardless of the merits of these proceedings, as they dragged on, Rauch must have gradually realized that he had become a pariah in the German academic system because he began to make plans to emigrate to the United States.

Rauch left Germany owing money to his lawyer and the University of Heidelberg. His inability to pay these debts probably hastened his decision to leave. He arrived in New York City in the fall of 1831, and quickly moved to Easton, Pennsylvania, a town already crowded with German-Americans, many of whom were members of the Reformed Church to which Rauch was accustomed. In 1832, he accepted a position as professor of the German language at the newly founded Lafayette College, but resigned three weeks later in order to accept a more secure position as “principal of the Classical Department and … professor of Biblical Literature” in the German Reformed Seminary in York, Pennsylvania.7 The Classical Department began as a preparatory school for the seminary, but quickly evolved into a college in its own right. In 1833, Rauch was married to Phoebe Moore, and in 1835 the school moved to Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, where, the following year, it became Marshall College with Rauch as President.8 The Seminary followed the College to Mercersburg two years later, taking the name, Mercersburg Seminary. Not long after the Seminary relocated, its Professor of Theology, Lewis Mayer, resigned, apparently over a theological dispute with students and Rauch.9 John Williamson Nevin, who would become an important theologian in his own right, was hired to replace Mayer with Rauch’s enthusiastic approval.10 Although he achieved it with great difficulty, at the relatively young age of thirty, Rauch had finally secured a stable academic position in which he was highly respected as well as a stable home life with a woman he loved dearly.

Despite his administrative responsibilities, after the move to Mercersburg, Rauch’s scholarly work did not lag. In 1837, he published “Ecclesiastical Historiography in Germany,” in which he began to display a debt to Hegelian philosophy.11 Among other works, Rauch completed a substantial essay on Goethe in 1839, and in 1840 he published his Psychology.12 Ziegler correctly characterized Rauch’s Psychology as his “climactic” work, not only because it was it his final scholarly production before his sudden death from unknown causes in 1841, but because “it stamps him as having been consistently Hegelian through the course of his American career.”13

When he died, Rauch was in the process of completing revisions for the second edition of his Psychology, which was published in 1841 with a “Preliminary Notice to the Second Edition” by Nevin. Some of the claims Nevin made in his “Preliminary Notice” are surely inaccurate, but this is not surprising given the fact that, once in the United States, Rauch was not entirely forthcoming about his checkered academic career in Germany. According to Nevin, Rauch “spent a year…at Giessen, as professor extraordinarius; at the end of which time, he received an appointment to a regular professorship in Heidelberg.” Nevin also asserted that Rauch left Germany, not because of legal difficulties, but because “In his lectures, he was supposed to have expressed himself with too much freedom with regard to government.”14 It is quite possible that Nevin’s knowledge of Rauch was tainted by the interpretation of his academic career that his colleagues preferred to present.

For the purposes of understanding Rauch’s thought, it is interesting that, according to Nevin, at Heidelberg Rauch “enjoyed…the special regard and favor of that aged giant in the sphere of mind, Charles Daub…”15 Although this claim is probably an exaggeration, Rauch’s six-volume collection of student notes on Daub’s lectures indicates that he was influenced by the Hegelian theologian at Heidelberg.16 Daub is also one of two people to whom Rauch dedicated his 1829 treatise on the similarities of various cultures, and in the Preface to his Pscychology, Rauch listed Daub as one of the authors to whom he was greatly indebted. It is possible that Rauch attended Daub’s lectures at Heidelberg in 1827 and the fall of 1828, and these lectures might explain the apparent shift in Rauch’s intellectual interest from philology to philosophy at this time. It is more difficult to determine in any detail other substantive influences Daub may have had on Rauch’s thought. We can gain insight into Rauch’s position within the spectrum of Hegel’s followers, however, through an examination of Daub’s personal and philosophical relationship to Hegel.

Daub is remembered as one of the Old Hegelians, the school of thought founded by Hegel and composed of his colleagues and graduate students. Daub and his fellow theologian at Heidelberg, Heinrich Paulus, had been instrumental in the hiring of Hegel at the University of Heidelberg in 1816. In particular, Daub worked to dispel the faculties’ concerns about Hegel’s notoriously monotonous lecture style and, on 30 July 1816, Daub made the formal offer to Hegel in a letter. Upon his arrival in the city, Daub quickly became one of Hegel’s closest friends, and at Daub’s insistence, Hegel was made editor of the Heidelberger Jahrbücher.17 Although Hegel accepted a position at the University of Berlin in 1818, he and Daub remained friends, so much so that Hegel trusted Daub to make the corrections and revisions necessary for the second edition of his Encyclopedia of Philosophy in 1827, the year Rauch arrived at Heidelberg. It should not be surprising that someone as close to Hegel as Daub would inspire in his students an interest in the philosopher’s works.

As a theologian, Daub’s primary interest was Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, especially the philosophy of religion, but he came to Hegel fairly late in his career and by a rather circuitous route. Throughout his career, Daub sought to construct a basis for a reinvigorated Christian culture in the dramatically changed context of the post-French Revolution modern world. Daub was dismissed from the theological faculty at Marburg in 1794 when he published a series of lectures on Kantian philosophy of religion that were deemed heretical.18 Like many Kantians, as the Reign of Terror diminished his initial excitement over the French Revolution, Daub began to reconsider his commitment to the transcendent principles of Kantian philosophy. For Daub and other Kantians, the ideals of autonomy and universality needed to be grounded in the concrete particularities of personal and collective experience. Daub resumed his academic career in 1796 at Heidelberg where, by 1806, he had converted to Schelling’s philosophy of absolute identity. At this time, Daub hoped to demonstrate that Christian dogma and the ethical teachings of biblical revelation could be validated objectively through Schelling’s speculative method of intellectual intuition. Phillip Marheineke, to whom Rauch expressed a debt in his “Ecclesiastical Historiography in Germany,” united with Daub in this endeavor when he joined the Theological Faculty at Heidelberg in 1807. After Marheineke moved to Berlin in 1811 to participate in the reformation of the Prussian educational and ecclesiastical system, both theologians developed misgivings about Schelling’s identity philosophy. Daub, for example, gradually began to doubt that Schelling’s method was appropriate to the task he had set for it, and in a massive two-volume study on the nature of evil, published in 1816 and 1818, Daub rejected Schelling’s identity philosophy on the grounds that evil resulted from the stubborn resistance of finite ego to achieve identity with the absolute. Daub and Marheineke both embraced Hegel’s philosophy around 1820, two years after Hegel left Heidelberg for the University of Berlin. Though Daub and Marheineke were relatively conservative Hegelians, theologically speaking, their tendency to employ Hegelian philosophy as a modern form of Christian apologetics was taken to a conservative extreme by Karl Friedrich Göschel, and two of Daub’s students, Kasimir Conradi and Isaak Rust, as they placed greater emphasis on the identity of the content of Christian doctrine and Hegelian philosophy.19

In 1838, Daub’s Anthropologie was published posthumously; the outline and design of Rauch’s Psychology is strikingly similar to it. Although it is possible that Rauch had access to Daub’s Anthropologie, we do not know that he did. The similarity between the two works can be easily explained by the simple fact that both follow the third part of Hegel’s Encyclopedia, the Philosophie des Geistes, or the Philosophy of Spirit (or Mind). If Rauch attended Daub’s lectures in 1827 and 1828, he would have heard Daub argue that Hegel’s philosophy was an authentic comprehension of the truth of the Christian revelation. Accordingly, in his Psychology, Rauch never expressed any doubt that Hegelian philosophy upholds Christian doctrine.

Rauch’s Psychology is divided in two parts that correspond to two essential topics within Hegelian philosophy of spirit, anthropology and psychology. In Part I, Rauch defined anthropology as the study of “the mind of man…in its connection with the body, in its dependence upon it, and through it upon nature.” More specifically, Rauch explained, “the object of Anthropology is to examine the external influences to which mind is subject, and its modifications produced by them.” He further divided Part I into a discussion of “the permanent influences of nature, of race, sex, etc., upon the mind,” followed by a discussion of “the transient influences of age, sleep, dreaming, etc.” Part I concludes with Rauch’s discussion “of the power of the mind over the body.”20 Within this organizational scheme, Rauch touched upon a wide variety of topics, including the effects of climate and region upon human development, racial and national differences, sexual differences, the four classical temperaments (sanguine, melancholic, choleric, and phlegmatic), the aging process, sleep, the formation of habits, and phrenology. In essence, anthropology studies “subjective mind,” or undeveloped consciousness. Subjective mind is the mind of the savage that is “wholly sunk in the life of nature” and “does not distinguish between [nature’s] activity and that of mind, but views both as merged into each other”; it is consciousness in itself.21 “Conscious mind” is able to distinguish itself from nature, the other, by reflecting on its sensations, which it views as objects. Yet, for conscious mind, these objects, sensations, are particular contents of its own consciousness. Although they are objects distinguishable from the subject, they are within the subject; they are a difference in identity, the subject’s own otherness. Conscious mind, in Hegel’s terminology, is consciousness for itself.

In Part II, Psychology, Rauch made the transition from consciousness in itself and consciousness for itself to consciousness in and for itself, self-consciouness or reason. Reason is in its own world, consciousness, but also encompasses the external world in itself. Not limited by the subject/object dichotomy, reason is free. Reason, self-conscious mind, knows the objects and contents of its perception as its own. Thought and the object are one; the Cartesian dualism between subjectivity and objectivity is overcome. The freedom achieved at this level is merely formal or theoretical, however. In order to actualize freedom, self-conscious mind must be determined by none other than itself. The development of self-determination is the development of will. Like Hegel, Rauch rejected faculty psychology, depicting cognition and volition as aspects of one mental life rather than separate faculties that can oppose one another.

Freedom is actualized in the moral life, thus Rauch proceeded to moral philosophy, what Hegel called the science of right. In comparison to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, however, Rauch’s treatment of the science of right is rather cursory. We know from Nevin’s “Preliminary Notice” that Rauch was preparing a volume on moral philosophy at the time of his death, and that he intended to follow that work with a volume on aesthetics. In his Psychology, however, Rauch only addressed inclinations or natural impulses, those that arise “from the relation in which man stands to himself,” e.g., self-love, and those that arise “from the relation of man to his fellow man,” e.g., property. Ultimately, in the love of mankind, the will recognizes its duty to align itself with the universal will and truly achieves moral status. “As the model of this love,” Rauch explained, “we have Christ, who persecuted by all, by the Jews, and Romans, and Greeks, surrounded by malice, voluptuousness, faithfulness [sic], standing alone in the midst of enemies, loved all, and hated none.22

Rauch ended the book with a discussion of religion, the study of man’s relationship to his Creator. Emphasizing the sovereignty and personality of God, Rauch claimed that true religion is “produced by a peculiar activity of God upon the heart of man.” That is to say, true religion is not attained by man’s effort; it is God’s action upon the individual’s heart, utterly changing the individual by restoring him to “peace with himself, with the world, and with God.”23 In brief discussions of various world religions – fetishism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, the Persian religion, the Egyptian religion, the Greek religion, and Roman religion – Rauch leaves no doubt in the reader’s mind that Christianity is the true religion and all others are mere superstitions. This final section demonstrates that Rauch’s Hegelianism is quite consistent with that of theologically conservative Hegelians such as Daub and Marheineke.

Rauch’s psychology received mixed reviews when it was published. Right away, reviewers raised the issue of the personality of God, in an effort to discern whether or not Rauch fell prey to the pantheistic heresy. Most notably, in an unsigned review in the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, one critic lavishly praised Rauch’s scholarship and his thoroughgoing rejection of materialism, but raised questions about certain passages that might be construed as pantheistic. Yet the reviewer was quick to note that the evidence of Rauch’s pantheism is ambiguous; thus he tried to give Rauch the benefit of the doubt.24 In 1842, however, James Murdock was not so kind to Rauch. In a chapter on Rauch’s philosophy in Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans, Murdock accused Rauch of pantheism in no uncertain terms, and went on to claim that Rauch’s Psychology “makes no allusion to any special Revelation from God, or to an apostasy of man, the intervention of a Savior, the forgiveness of sin in consequence of an atonement, a future judgment, and eternal retributions after the present life.”25 Murdock’s attack continued, but this much will suffice to demonstrate that he was adamant about Rauch’s heresy. Fourteen years later, E. V. Gerhart, a graduate of Marshall College and Mercersburg Seminary and president of Franklin and Marshall College from 1855 to 1866, resented Murdock’s broadside against Rauch enough to pen a reply, claiming that Murdock had “cast odium upon Franklin and Marshall College, and through it upon the German Reformed Church, because the College has, for the last twenty years, used Dr. Rauch’s Psychology … as a textbook in Mental Philosophy.”26

Rather than descend into the murky details of the debate about Rauch’s orthodoxy, I will conclude by noting, not only that Rauch’s Psychology was obviously influential at Mercersburg for many years, but that it was also used as a text at the Universities of Vermont and Dartmouth College among other places.27 Nevin reports that the first edition “was exhausted in a very few weeks after its publication.” Moreover, by 1853, the second edition had been reprinted four times.28 Orestes A. Brownson, an early leader of the Transcendentalist movement, welcomed Rauch’s book as a brilliant work.29 Moreover, Rauch’s philosophical thought prepared the way for the Mercersburg Theology that developed after his death under Nevin and Philip Schaff. All of this indicates that the text was widely read by American intellectuals and thus deserves the continued interest of historians as the first book that “started with … Hegelian tenacity to build a bridge across the Atlantic.”30

 

James A. Good
Rice University, Texas, 2002


1 A. A. Roback, History of American Psychology (New York, Library Publishers, 1952), 57. Though the first in the United States, Rauch’s Psychology was not the first book in the English language with the word “psychology” in the title. That distinction belongs to an 1834 translation of Victor Cousin’s Psychology. Victor Cousin, Elements of Psychology Included in a Critical Examination of Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding, trans. C.S. Henry (Hartford, Conn.: Cooke and Co., 1834).

2 Harvey Gates Townsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United States (New York: American Book Company, 1934), 81. Cf. J.H. Muirhead, “How Hegel Came To America,” Philosophical Review 37 (June 1928): 232–33.

3 For biographical information on Rauch, I rely primarily on Howard J.D. Ziegler, Frederick Augustus Rauch: American Hegelian (Lancaster, Penn.: Franklin and Marshall College, 1953). Ziegler corrected the mythology contained in early histories of Franklin and Marshall College about Rauch’s career in Germany and his reasons for emigrating to America. For the mythological account see John Nevin’s “Preliminary Notice to the Second Edition,” contained in this volume, and Richard C. Schiedt, “A Tribute to Frederick Augustus Rauch—On the 125th Anniversary of His Birth,” Reformed Church Messenger (18 June 1931): 7–10.

4 Quoted in Ziegler, Frederick Augustus Rauch, 3.

5 The title of the treatise can be translated as Observations on Sophocles’s Electra. For a bibliography of Rauch’s published works see Ziegler, Frederick Augustus Rauch, 93–4.

6 Ziegler, Frederick Augustus Rauch, 15. Privatdozenten received no salary from their university, but were paid simply out of fees collected from students who attended their lectures. The Ministry of the Interior and the Giessen faculty may have decided that Rauch’s reputation was so tarnished by the time the Ministry approved his petition that he would draw too few students to financially support himself. Indeed, as the son of a Minister, Rauch had never been on a particularly secure financial footing.

7 H.M.J. Klein, History of the Eastern Synod of the Reformed Church in the United States (Lancaster, Penn.: Rudisill and Smith Co., 1943), 156.

8 In 1853, Marshall College merged with Franklin College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania forming Franklin and Marshall College, which exists to this day. For more information about the school’s move to Mercersburg see James I. Good, History of the Reformed Church in the U.S. in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America, 1911), 76ff.

9 James I. Good covers the theological dispute that surrounded Mayer’s resignation in some detail. James I. Good, History of the Reformed Church, 84–91.

10 An Old School Presbyterian, Nevin was educated at Union College and Princeton Theological Seminary. He discovered German philosophy and theology when he read James Marsh’s edition of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection. Rauch must have reinforced Nevin’s developing interest in Hegelian theology. For secondary sources on Nevin and what came to be known as the “Mercersburg Theology,” see Theodore Appel, The Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin (Philadelphia: Reformed Church Publication House, 1889; New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1969); John I. Swander, The Mercersburg Theology, The Swander Memorial Lectures (Philadelphia: Reformed Church Publication Board, 1909); George Warren Richards, “The Mercersburg Theology Historically Considered,” Papers of the American Society of Church History, 2nd Series, 3 (1910–11): 118–49; Frederic Shriver Klein, The Spiritual and Educational Background of Franklin and Marshall College, Franklin and Marshall College Studies, Number Two (Lancaster, Penn.: Commercial Printing House, 1939); James Hastings Nicholls, Romanticism in American Theology: Nevin and Schaff at Mercersburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); James Hastings Nicholls, ed., The Mercersburg Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); Robert Clemmer, “Historical Transcendentalism in Pennsylvania,” Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969): 579–92; and Bruce Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 171–77.

11 Frederich A. Rauch, “Ecclesiastical Historiography in Germany,” Biblical Respository (October 1837). Reprinted in The Reformed Church Review 9 (July 1905): 380–402.

12 Rauch’s essay, “Goethe,” was published posthumously in the Mercersburg Review 12 (1860): 329–85. Frederich A. Rauch, Psychology; or, a view of the Human Soul; including Anthropology (New York: M.W. Dodd, 1840).

13 Ziegler, Frederick Augustus Rauch, 33.

14 Rauch, Psychology, vii (emphasis in the original).

15 Ibid., vii (emphasis in the original). In his eulogy for Rauch, Nevin wrote: “... it was understood that serious difficulties had already actually occurred in the official connections of Dr. Rauch [probably a reference to Rauch’s disagreements with the professor Niven replaced], in the case of which the large share of the blame was supposed by many to rest properly on his shoulders. All anxiety of this sort, however, fled my spirit, in a very short time, when I came to know the man himself. I found myself attracted to him from the very first. His countenance was the index of his heart, open, generous and pure. I soon felt that my relations with him were likely to be both pleasant and safe. Further acquaintance only served to strengthen this first impression. It was clear to me that he had been misunderstood and wronged. He was one of the last men probably to be capable of disingenuous cunning or dishonorable dealing in any way.” Quoted in Appel, Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin, 101.

16 Ziegler, Frederick Augustus Rauch, 95. Rauch could not have attended all of Daub’s lectures for which he owned notes. They were student notes that Rauch probably purchased while he was a student at Heidelberg. In German universities at this time, it was not unusual for one or more students to take verbatim notes on the lectures of renowned professors and then sell them to other students. For example, Hegel’s posthumously published works are actually students’ multi-volume notes on his lectures, e.g., Lectures on Aesthetics, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Lectures on the History of Philosophy.

17 Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 330–31, 384.

18 Karl Daub, Predigten nach Kantischen Grundsätzen (Königsberg, 1794).

19 It is hazardous to draw conclusions about Daub’s or Marheineke’s political leanings from the fact that, theologically, they were relatively conservative Hegelians. The initial split among Hegelians after Hegel’s death in 1831, into “Old” and “Young Hegelians,” primarily concerned theological matters. Dissenting Hegelians were politically radicalized by intense political persecution during the 1840s and only then splintered into politically Left and Right wings. Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought, trans. David E. Green (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); and John Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Warren Breckman has recently argued that the path to radical political theory in the 1840s was prefigured in theological debates in which critics of Hegel argued that his philosophy was pantheistic and denied the personality of God. Some critics of Hegel’s philosophy of religion who sought to emphasize the notion of personality, like the later Schelling, also sought to emphasize the personalism of the state in the absolute power of the monarch. Nevertheless, Breckman does not argue for a one to one correspondence between theological and political conservatives. Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origin of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

20 Rauch, Psychology, 53–54.

21 Ibid., 68.

22 Ibid., 360 (emphasis in the original).

23 Ibid., 388.

24 Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review 12 (July 1840): 393–410.

25 James Murdock, Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans (Hartford: J.C. Wells, 1842), 199.

26 E. V. Gerhart, “Dr. Murdock on Rauch’s Psychology,The Mercersburg Quarterly Review 8 (April, 1856): 237.

27 Good, History of the Reformed Church, 103.

28 Rauch, Psychology, ix.

29 Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933), 15: 390.

30 Paul S. Leinbach, “Building Bridges,” an editorial forward to Richard C. Schiedt, “A Tribute to Frederick Augustus Rauch on the 125th anniversary of his birth,” The Reformed Church Messenger 104 (June 18, 1931), 3.


James A. Good (ed.), 'Introduction', The Early American Reception of German Idealism (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2002), Volume 1 pp. v- xvii.

© James A. Good, 2002.