James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934) was one of American psychology’s greatest contributors, both professionally and intellectually. Professionally, he founded experimental laboratories at the Universities of Toronto and Princeton, established two important journals: The Psychological Review and The Psychological Bulletin, and served as President of the American Psychological Association.
Intellectually, Baldwin was one of the field’s most prolific authors and quite possibly its most sophisticated thinker. Over the course of his career, he published twenty-two books and approximately one-hundred-fifty articles. Among his publications were the field’s first well-controlled experimental studies of infant behavior and a work, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, that was awarded the Gold Medal of the Danish Academy of Sciences. Between 1901 and 1905 he edited a three volume Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology that is still one of the best sources for turn-of-the-century thought in these disciplines. This led directly to his receiving Oxford University’s first honorary doctorate of science. Baldwin was also the recipient of honorary degrees from the College of South Carolina, the University of Geneva, and the University of Glasgow. In 1910, he was elected to succeed William James as Correspondent of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, Institute of France.
Baldwin’s biosocial approach introduced a level of complexity in conceptualizaton of the mind, its evolutionary origins, ontogenetic development, and sociocultural formation that went far beyond the prevailing thought of the period. He addressed topics as varied as the nature of developmental and evolutionary mechanisms, the relationship between reason and reality, the genesis of logic, the value of aesthetic experience, and the nature and development in children of habit, imitation, creative invention, altruism, egoism, morality, social suggestibility, social self, self-awareness, theory of mind, and enculturation. His use and in some cases introduction of concepts such as multiplicity of self, ideal self, self-esteem, assimilation, accommodation, primary circular reaction, genetic logic, genetic epistemology, and social heredity exerted a formative influence on later scholars such as George Herbert Mead, Jean Piaget, Lev S. Vygotsky, and Lawrence Kohlberg.
Why then isn’t Baldwin better known? How is it that so few have read his work? The answer lies in a peculiar confluence of circumstances. In 1908, a public scandal led to Baldwin’s resignation from his academic position at Johns Hopkins University. For four years he divided his time between Paris and Mexico City, where he served the Mexican government as a consultant and held a visiting professorship at the University of Mexico. From 1912 until his death in 1934, he lived in Paris, coming back to the United States only occasionally and never returning to American academic life.
When Baldwin left psychology, there were few who could then follow his intellectual lead. He had no major students. Neither he nor anybody else had scientific methods adequate to the sophistication of his ideas or the study of his questions; and American psychology was committing itself ever more deeply to an experimental empiricism that would soon culminate in the behaviorism of the 1920s. Indeed, by 1929, when Edwin G. Boring published his famous History of Experimental Psychology, Baldwin could be cavalierly dismissed with the assertion that his “felicitous literary style, surpassed only by James, gave a transient vitality to his ideas: but his effect was not permanent.”1
Although this assessment may have made sense in 1929, in the light of recent history it is very wide of the mark. Many of Baldwin’s ideas have become foundational in contemporary developmental psychology. Through the work of those mentioned above and that of others, Baldwin has indirectly exerted a significant influence on contemporary thinking in areas of both cognitive and social development.
Indeed, in recent years, there has been something of a Baldwin renaissance. His name is now better known among psychologists and he is much more likely to be cited in relation to biosocial views of mind. The republication here of some of Baldwin’s most important works will make it easier for scholars to return to the original texts. If they do, they will discover that there is profit still to be gained from reading Baldwin. The purpose of this essay is to indicate potential sources of this profit through an analysis of some of Baldwin’s more influential ideas in the context of a general outline of his life.
Childhood and Early Education, 1861–1881. James Mark Baldwin was born in Columbia, South Carolina on January 12, 1861. His father, Cyrus Hull Baldwin, was a businessman and sometime federal official. Both he and his wife, Lydia Eunice Ford Baldwin, hailed originally from Connecticut. The little that is known about Baldwin’s childhood derives almost exclusively from a few reflections on “early boyhood” that he included in Between Two Wars, his otherwise largely intellectual and professional autobiography.2
In these reflections, Baldwin tells us that he attended a series of private elementary schools in Columbia. After leaving school, he worked in a dry goods store for two years, then traveled in 1878 to Salem, New Jersey to enter the Salem Collegiate Institute, a college preparatory institution run by an uncle on his mother’s side. In 1881, he enrolled as a sophomore at Princeton University, then known as the College of New Jersey.
Princeton, 1881–1884. Intending eventually to enter the Presbyterian ministry, Baldwin followed Princeton’s academic program of studies. Much of his coursework was focused on language and philosophy; and it was in his philosophical work that he came under the influence of Princeton’s President, James McCosh.3 McCosh was perhaps the last great exponent of the natural realism of the Scottish school and certainly the first great influence in Baldwin’s intellectual life.
The fundamental tenet of McCosh’s natural realism was that the human mind is constituted by innate (i.e., God given) intuitions – tendencies to mental action, common to all men, that operate when appropriate objects are presented to call them forth. The mind, in other words, is so constituted as “to reflect the object…as it is.”4 Intuitions and reality existed, for McCosh, in a kind of pre-established harmony, “a correspondence whereby the one knows and the other is known.”5
This perspective, which stakes out the middle ground between idealism, on the one hand, and materialism, on the other, allowed McCosh to be open to the advancement of science without viewing scientific progress as a threat to religion. Progress in understanding reality brought about by valid science could not, by its nature, contradict valid principles of religion inasmuch as both were regulated by intuitions conferred on the human mind by God.
One result of this view was that, under McCosh, science at Princeton was taught without regard to religion and religion without regard to science.6 A second result was that McCosh felt free to introduce both Wundt’s “new” physiological psychology and evolutionism to his undergraduates at Princeton. All of this exerted a powerful effect on the young Baldwin.
At Princeton Baldwin proved to be an excellent student. In his senior year he served as a managing editor of the Nassau Literary Magazine and received a number of academic distinctions, including the Baird Prize. His most important award, however, was the Green Fellowship in Mental Science, which carried with it financial support for a year’s post-baccalaureate study in Europe.
Germany, 1884–1885. Graduating with the A.B. in 1884, Baldwin set off almost immediately for Germany. There, he spent the summer improving his knowledge of German language and culture before engaging in three semesters of study, one at Leipzig, one at Berlin, and one at Freiburg. If we can judge from Baldwin’s own account, the most important of these were those at Leipzig and Berlin.7
At Leipzig, where Wilhelm Wundt had recently established his psychological laboratory, Baldwin attended Wundt’s lectures and served in the laboratory as an experimental subject. As a result, he became, as he put it, “an enthusiast for the new psychology…[with] the full outfit of ideas – Fechner’s and Weber’s laws, the technique of reaction-time experiments, theories of mind and body, and cognate points of view as propounded by Lotze, Fechner, and Wundt.”8
At Berlin, he studied Spinoza under Friedrich Paulsen.9 There he must have been somewhat surprised to discover in Spinoza’s pantheistic metaphysic a powerful logical justification for the pre-established harmony between mind and reality that had been taken at Princeton to be a self-evident, intuitive maxim. That Baldwin fully appreciated the implications of Spinoza’s view is indicated in a paper, “The Idealism of Spinoza,”10 representing his work in Paulsen’s seminar.11 “We would be justified,” he notes, “in claiming for Spinoza a realistic theory of knowledge…Spinoza says distinctly…‘For the true idea must necessarily agree with its object – that is…what is present in the understanding as the object of thought must necessarily exist in nature.’”12
At the end of his fellowship year, Baldwin returned to Princeton. There he entered the Theological Seminary and accepted a position as Instructor in French and German in the College.
Princeton Again, 1885–1887. Upon his arrival in Princeton, Baldwin was asked by McCosh to present the “new” psychology to one of the regular discussion sessions then being held in the library of the President’s home. The need to prepare this presentation undoubtedly provided impetus for Baldwin to begin work on two of his most important projects of the period – a translation of Théodule Ribot’s German Psychology of To-day13 and Baldwin’s first major paper “The Postulates of a Physiological Psychology.”14
Ribot’s German Psychology was the first history of the “new” psychology to be published. Tracing the origins of the new view from Kant, through Herbart, Fechner, and Lotze to Wundt, Ribot emphasized the development of a new conception of psychological experimentation involving the measurement of variation in internal states of consciousness (i.e., the intensity of sensation) as a function of the quantitative manipulation of external stimulation (i.e., the intensity of excitation). This conception of experimentation as proceeding from external cause to internal effect offered Baldwin a way to make a principled distinction between this new psychological approach and the inductive, descriptive introspection of McCosh in which internal causes lead to external effects.
In “The Postulates of a Physiological Psychology,” published in 1887, Baldwin embodied this insight within an integrative framework for mental science built from the metaphysics of Spinoza, the Scottish mental philosophy, and the new psychology. Beginning with the Spinozan metaphysic, Baldwin argued a coordinative epistemology:
To say that the soul is natural…is to say that nature is intelligent and that the laws of thought are the laws of things…if nature be natural it must be construed by mind. We know nature as we think it. Nature apart from thought would not be the nature that we know, since nature is realized thought…A thing is an object, and a thing which is not thought is…a thing with nothing objective about it – that is, no thing. And this is necessarily so from the nature of the perceptive process. Perception has both its objective and its subjective side; that is, perception without an object can not be perception, just as the object without perception cannot be an object… .15
This allowed Baldwin to bring the inductive mental science of McCosh and the experimental psychology of Wundt within a single overarching framework:
We may obtain psychic data from without as well as from within, for the without is as necessary to the within as the within is to the without…Far from undermining the standpoint of the old psychology – that is, the inductive science of…the Scottish school, this position tends to confirm it; for consciousness can never be escaped, and a groundwork of ascertained knowledge is necessary for scientific construction. The experimenter on association must know that there are ideas and that they are associated, and only a descriptive, that is, a subjective psychology, can give these facts…Evidently the most sensible…method of procedure is to define psychology as the science of psychic phenomena, external and internal, and to consider the area of its domain the conscious wherever we find it.16
In 1887, Baldwin was appointed to a professorship in philosophy at Lake Forest University in Illinois. He was to remain at Lake Forest for two years.
Lake Forest, 1887–1889. During Baldwin’s tenure at Lake Forest, he married Helen Hayes Green, daughter of the President of Princeton Theological Seminary, and completed the doctorate at Princeton under McCosh. Although Baldwin had initially expected to write his dissertation on Spinoza, McCosh insisted instead that he produce a refutation of materialism. This Baldwin did, publishing a portion of the thesis work in 1890 as “Recent Discussion in Materialism.”17
While at Lake Forest, Baldwin also published his first book, Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect,18 an extended elaboration of the coordinative relation between induction and experimentation worked out in the “Postulates.” In this work Baldwin gives free rein to the powerful drive for integration and systematization that will come to characterize virtually all of his life’s work.
Drawing on both the “new” experimental and the “old” mental philosophy traditions, Baldwin divides Intellect into Apperceptive and Rational functions. Analysis of the Apperceptive Function, which takes up almost the entire book, proceeds under four general rubrics: Presentation (sensation and perception), Representation (memory and recognition), Combination (association, imagination, and illusion), and Elaboration (thought). While this format reflects Baldwin’s deep roots in mental philosophy, it is in the content of these chapters that he departs from the traditional mental philosophy approach, incorporating data from the new experimental psychology, such as that of Weber, Fechner, and especially Wundt.
Analysis of the Rational Function is limited to a single (albeit the final) chapter. Here Baldwin presents his version of the essentials of natural realism, analyzing the nature and function of Rational Intuition as both constitutive and regulative of Mind, as mental act and mental product, and as leading irrevocably to the “ultimate end of knowledge…the comprehension of self in relation to the world and God.”19
Publication of Senses and Intellect marked the end of Baldwin’s mental philosophy period and the beginning of his transition to experimental psychologist. It also led to his being offered the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Toronto.
Toronto, 1889–1893. At Toronto, Baldwin established Canada’s first laboratory of experimental psychology and initiated quantitative, experimental research on infant development that led to the publication of a classic series of papers on infant reaching. These observations also mark the beginning of Baldwin’s shift toward the evolutionary perspective on mind for which he is now best remembered.
Baldwin’s developmental work began with the birth of his first daughter, Helen, in 1889. Another daughter, Elizabeth, arrived in 1891. Intrigued by the baby’s behavior, Baldwin designed a series of experiments to examine developmental changes in infant reaching. His research questions were simple – under what conditions, at what ages, and with what hand or hands will an infant reach?
To explore these questions, Baldwin observed Helen in a long series of reaching experiments extending from her fourth to her tenth month. Objects and colors were placed in front of the infant “in positions exactly determined and recorded by a simple arrangement of sliding rods.”20 To minimize unwanted sources of variability and rule out inadvertent bias,
The experiments took place at the same hour daily…(and) certain precautions were carefully enforced. She [Helen] was never carried about in arms at all – never walked with when crying or sleepless…; she was frequently turned over in her sleep; she was not allowed to balance herself on her feet until a later period than that covered by the experiments.21
In addition to these somewhat draconian precautions, the objects and colors toward which the baby was allowed to reach, as well as their distance and direction from her body, were all systematically varied, and midway through each series of experiments, the child’s position at the table was reversed.
Although Baldwin’s results – optimal reaching distance at 9–10 inches, a preponderance of two-handed reaching, and right-hand preference only with brightly colored objects – are interesting and important, the real value of this work for an emerging psychological science was its thorough objectivism. Not only did Baldwin employ methods that were experimental, controlled, and quantitative, he did so in the context of explicit concern for issues of experimental design and with an exclusive focus on the development of a particular kind of behavior.
Even more importantly, these observations forced Baldwin into a radical revision of his systematic approach. From his neo-Spinozan perspective, the laws of thought were conceived to exist in pre-established coordination with the laws of things. Yet in the observation of his daughters, Baldwin was brought face to face with the cognitive immaturity and rapid intellectual growth of the human infant. How could the laws of thought and the laws of things exist in preestablished harmony when the laws of thought evolved over the course of individual development? How could reason be designed by God as an immutable intuition guaranteeing adequate apprehension of reality when reason only became progressively more adequate to reality over the course of development?
Baldwin had no choice but to reconstrue his systematic conception within a developmental framework. At the same time, however, if the fundamental insights of natural realism and the coordinative epistemology were not to be lost, this reconstruction had somehow to retain both the regulative role of natively given principles of mind and some form of harmony between reason and reality. While it might no longer be possible to conceive of the content of thought as regulated by fixed native principles, perhaps such principles could control the direction of intellectual development toward a progressively more adequate conception of reality. While it might no longer be possible to view reason and reality as existing in preestablished coordination, perhaps this coordination might be the end-point toward which development is directed.
Having come to some such realization, Baldwin faced the problem of finding a mechanism whereby the validity of such a developing coordination could be guaranteed. Although he was not yet fully aware of it, such a mechanism was already close at hand in the theory of evolution. When Baldwin fastened on this theory, his conception of psychology would be totally transformed.
Concurrent with his infant observations, Baldwin was working on the second volume of his Handbook of Psychology. Subtitled Feeling and Will, it appeared in 1891.22 Replacing the global concept of apperception, around which Senses and Intellect had been organized, with a model based on presumed characteristics of nervous integration, Baldwin began for the first time to focus on the process by which the mind acquires new psychological material. In Baldwin’s view, this process involves both a consolidation of habit and an accommodation to new elements. “Habit,” Baldwin suggested, issues “in established paths of least resistance”23 and is characterized psychologically by diffusion of attention and automatic action. Accommodation assimilates new elements in conformity to the demands of the environment and is characterized psychologically by concentration of attention and voluntary action.
At the same time, Baldwin was becoming increasingly impressed with a phenomenon that Piaget later termed the sensorimotor principle. When an element of reality – an object, event or person – is presented to the consciousness of an infant (e.g., when a rattle is shown to a baby), the infant’s tendency is to cognize that element through direct and immediate action on it (e.g., grasping, shaking, and sucking the rattle). Noticing the psychological similarity between this principle and hypnotic suggestibility, a phenomenon then very much at the center of psychological interest, especially in France, Baldwin returned to Europe in 1892 “with the intention,” as he put it, “of getting information on the subject of hypnotism and suggestion…I visited the Salpetrière, saw the great Charcot a work, [and] attended the clinics of Janet and others….”24
Baldwin also visited Hippolyte Bernheim at Nancy. Bernheim had published a classic early work on suggestion, De la suggestion dans l’état hypnotique et dans l’état de veille,25 in which suggestion was viewed as the working out of an idiodynamic tendency of mind, a tendency in the absence of inhibiting factors such as reflection, for ideas to be cognized directly in terms of related actions. Hypnosis, on this account, is simply a method, one of several, for producing suspension of reflection and thereby placing action directly under the control of whatever is presented to the mind (e.g., the stage hypnotist says “bark like a dog” and the hypnotized subject barks like a dog).
From his experiences in France, Baldwin became convinced of the psychological importance of suggestion and of the suggestibility of the human being, especially the infant, for whom the capacity for reflection is as yet undeveloped. But Baldwin took this principle as it applied to development a step further. He recognized that many of the actions most readily elicited idiodynamically in infants bear some resemblance to characteristics of the presentations that elicit them. This is most especially, although not exclusively, true for social presentations (e.g., smiles, waves, vocalizations). Baldwin, in other words, had hit upon the importance of imitation in the child’s development, particularly with respect to the regulation of habit and accommodation in voluntary action. As he later described it:
In…a series of articles reporting observations on infants, published in part in the journal Science, 1890–1892…I found it necessary constantly to enlarge my scope for the entertainment of a widened genetic view. This came to clearer consciousness in the treatment of the child’s imitations, especially when I came to the relation of imitation to volition…The farther study of this subject brought what was to me such a revelation of the genetic function of imitation that I then determined…to work out a theory of mental development in the child, incorporating this new insight.26
While this work was still in progress, Baldwin was offered the Stuart Chair in Psychology and the opportunity to establish a new psychological laboratory at his alma mater. In 1893 he returned to Princeton.
Princeton: Period of Consolidation, 1893–1897. Inspired by his new appreciation for “the genetic function of imitation,” Baldwin devoted his first graduate seminar to the topic of mental development in the child. One result of this seminar, as he tells us, was the conviction that “no consistent view of mental development in the individual could possibly be reached without a doctrine of the race development of consciousness.”27 To work toward such a doctrine, Baldwin began to read “again the literature of biological evolution, with view to a possible synthesis of the current biological theory of organic adaptation with the doctrine of the infant’s development.”28
Drawing on this literature, his own already published work on infant reaching and suggestion, and earlier psychological theories of individual adaptation elaborated by Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain,29 Baldwin completed a manuscript incorporating his first extended statement of evolutionary psychology in December of 1894. This work, Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and Processes,30 is one of the most important and certainly the most famous of Baldwin’s texts.
From the outset, he made it clear that he no longer subscribed to the mental philosophy view of mind:
The older idea of the soul was of a fixed substance, with fixed attributes. Knowledge of the soul was immediate in consciousness, and adequate…The mind was best understood where best or most fully manifested…If the adult consciousness shows the presence of principles not observable in the child consciousness, we must suppose, nevertheless, that they are really present in the child consciousness beyond the reach of our observation….The genetic idea reverses all this. Instead of a fixed substance, we have the conception of a growing, developing activity. Functional psychology succeeds faculty psychology…the adult consciousness must, if possible, be interpreted by principles present in the child consciousness.31
Mind, Baldwin had now fully come to realize, is a developing function. Moreover, if mental development is to be guaranteed a validity with respect to material reality, mind must itself be conceived in terms of the broader phylogenetic history of the human species. This Baldwin called the question of “race experience…[whether] what is present in the mind now, in the way of function, is due somehow to the past.”32
Adopting a modified recapitulationism,33 Baldwin suggested that there is an analogy between individual and race growth. “We find more and more developed stages of conscious function in a series corresponding in the main with the stages of nervous growth in the animals; and then we find this growth paralleled in its great features in the mental development of the human infant.”34 Yet this parallelism is far from strict. In fact, necessary stages in the development of the ancestors in a phylogenetic series are often omitted in the descendants. These “organic short cuts,” as Baldwin like to call them, suggest the likelihood that the acquired adaptations of individuals may influence the evolutionary progress of the species. As Baldwin saw it, the issue was one of “whether the effects of habit, itself a phenomenon of development, would not be inherited, or selected, thus abbreviating the ontogenetic process.”35 To lay the groundwork for an exploration of this issue, Baldwin devoted the bulk of Mental Development to elaborating a biopsychological theory of processes of individual intellectual growth or adaptation.
Not surprisingly, Baldwin started from the dynamogenic principle that the natural tendency of the organism is to relate to objects by acting on them. “Every sensation or incoming process tends to bring about action or outgoing process.”36 Following (and to an extent criticizing) Spencer and Bain, Baldwin pointed out that actions themselves, no matter how complex, are always directed either toward pleasurable or away from painful objects. In any adaptive action, two principles are operative, habit and accommodation. Habit provides for “the repetition of what is worth repeating…. [Accommodation] secures, progressively, further useful reactions, which at an earlier stage would have been impossible.”37
How are habit and accommodation related? Here Baldwin draws on his “revelation” concerning the genetic function of imitation. Habit and accommodation are integrated through imitative action in which “the stimulus starts a motor process which tends to reproduce the stimulus and, through it, the motor process again…a circular activity.”38 Furthermore, these imitative acts are never exact repetitions of one another. Rather repetition takes place with variation. When successful, variations that bring about the pleasure or avoid the pain of maintaining contact with a stimulus are “selected so as to adapt the organism better and give it a life-history.”39
It is important to note that this process, for which Baldwin adopted the term organic selection,40 is in effect a natively given functional mechanism by means of which the mind gradually develops a progressively more adequate adjustment to the real world. In his concept of organic selection, in other words, Baldwin has found a new theoretical mechanism to replace intuition in accounting for the coordination of reason with reality.
What this concept could not by itself explain, however, was the validity of the developing coordination. Why should the developmental outcome of organic selection be a progressively more adequate adjustment to the world when, like all rational principles, it is a natively given constitutive principle of human mind? Although Baldwin’s answer to this question was not yet fully worked out in Mental Development, it is clear that he was already aware of the direction that his argument would eventually take.
“No theory of development,” he suggested, “is complete…which does not account for the transmission in some way, from one generation to another, of the gains of the earlier generations, turning individual gains into race gains.”41 In 1895, his ideas were still somewhat hazy in this regard;42 but being very much a neo-Darwinian in his evolutionary point of view, he knew that he needed to invoke the principle of natural selection to account for any such process. He also knew that the ability to acquire new adaptations of one or another sort might itself vary congenitally and be subject to natural selection. If so, over evolutionary time, later acquisitions of individual organisms might somehow reflect the earlier variations. As Baldwin suggested in 1895, “it is only necessary to hold to a view by which variations are cumulative to secure the same results by natural selection as would have been secured by the inheritance of acquired characters from father to son.”43
On this account, the developmental mechanism by which mind becomes progressively more adequate to reality is itself a mechanism selected for in the evolutionary history of the species. Since the process of natural selection is, by its nature, one through which species function becomes better adjusted to the environment, the mechanism underlying organic selection is guaranteed a certain validity. Grounded in phylogenesis, the regulative principles governing the direction of mental development are just those that assure the survival of the species. While on the one hand development precludes the possibility that the coordination of reason with reality reflects natively given content, on the other it affords progressive coordination through natively given, evolutionarily developed process. In his evolutionary psychology, Baldwin had once again found the means to conserve the spirit of natural realism while remaining an active proponent of a scientific and developmental psychology.
Reprinted six times within ten years and multiply translated, Mental Development influenced several generations of scholars, most notably the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, who made extensive use of Baldwin’s ideas in his seminal La Naissance de l’intelligence chez l’enfant.44 By the time Mental Development was published, however, Baldwin was already at work on an extension of his developmental, evolutionary insight to the then neglected area of social psychology. As he described the situation, “we have no social psychology because we have had no doctrine of the socius. We have had theories of the ego and the alter; but that they did not reveal the socius is just their condemnation.”45
Starting from the notion that the principle of circular reaction with selection is the “fundamental method of fruitful organic reaction to the environment of things and persons,”46 Baldwin developed a remarkably sophisticated theory of social adaptation to complement his theory of mental development. These ideas first appeared in 1897, in Baldwin’s masterpiece, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development. A Study in Social Psychology.47 Although Social and Ethical Interpretations is not as well known or as widely cited as Mental Development, it is a much more thorough, systematic, and seminal treatment than the earlier work. Here Baldwin not only extends his analysis of adaptation to the social domain; he greatly clarifies that analysis, elucidating the general nature of the circular reaction, the relationship between habit and accommodation, and the relevance to adaptation of dynamogenesis, suggestibility and imitation.
For Baldwin, there are, in effect, three basic components of adaptive mental function: Habit, Presentation, and Thought. These components, as we will see, both underlie and become progressively adapted through the exercise of a circular reaction. Habit is the individual’s system of mental representations. It is, as Baldwin liked to say, the individual’s “life history.” Presentation is whatever in the real world is present to the senses (external and internal) at any given moment; and Thought, a term that Baldwin uses quite generically to refer to the content of present consciousness, is a joint function of Presentation and Habit. Thought, in other words, is Presentation assimilated (cognized, given meaning) on the basis of Habit.
However, for Baldwin, Habit is not simply representational, it is dispositional. Habit is not only the storehouse of past experience; it is a system of tendencies to Action. Thought (current conscious content) resulting from the assimilation of Presentation to Habit, therefore, always has associated with it and tends to issue in relevant Action. This is, of course, the principle of dynamogenesis. By its very nature as Presentation assimilated to a dispositional Habit system, Thought tends to express itself in Action.
Action, however, is not neutral. Action (unlike Thought) directly alters the real world and therefore changes Presentation. And it does so in terms of both an “inner felt series” (e.g., the baby feels herself move as she shakes a rattle) and an “outer felt series” (e.g., the baby sees the movement of her arms and of the rattle as she shakes it). The resultant Presentation therefore contains elements that are relatively novel as well as those that are familiar. Assimilation of this new combination of novel and familiar forces a change in Habit (i.e., an accommodation). Because Thought is Presentation assimilated to Habit, change in Habit yields new conscious content, i.e., accommodated Thought.
The new Thought, of course, like all Thought, then expresses itself in new Action. This changes Presentation which leads to the accommodation of Habit. The accommodation of Habit again yields new Thought which once again expresses itself in novel Action and so on and on. The adaptive process continues in this circular fashion throughout life.
Here we have what is, in effect, a theory of learning, a hypothetical mechanism by which Action, Conscious Experience (Thought), and an underlying dispositional cognitive system (Habit) change in an adaptive fashion as a function of experience. For the period, this was a significant contribution and it is one that has had long-lasting, albeit indirect, influence on developmental psychology through the later work of Piaget who incorporated Baldwin’s mechanism into his own approach to sensorimotor development.48
But Baldwin did not rest content with a general theory of individual adaptation. He immediately adapted his model to explain the microgenesis of the social self. Social Thought is simply consciousness filled with social content (e.g., the smile of a parent, the aggressive movement of a peer, the self-aggrandizing behavior of an older sibling, a teacher’s request, or even an adolescent fad or public opinion). Like all Thought, Social Thought is a joint function of Habit and Presentation. When Presentation contains social content, Baldwin calls it “Social Suggestion” to emphasize the dynamogenic nature of Social Thought. As in the general model, this dynamogenic quality is derived from the fact that Social Thought gets its meaning from the assimilation of Social Suggestion to Habit; and since Habit is a disposition to Action, Social Thought tends to express itself in Social Action.
It is in conceptualizing Social Action that Baldwin goes well beyond the general theory. For Baldwin, Social Action can be viewed from two different perspectives. To the extent that it reflects Social Suggestion, that is, to the extent that it mirrors that which is presented, Baldwin calls it “imitation.” On the other hand, to the extent that Social Action varies from Social Suggestion and therefore leads to the accommodation of Habit, Baldwin calls it “invention.” Imitation and invention are two sides of the same Social Action, a Social Action that alters Social Suggestion which in turn leads to the accommodation of Habit and the construction of new Social Thought which leads to still new Social Action (i.e., new imitations, new inventions) and so on, again, in circular fashion throughout life.
But how does Baldwin conceive of criteria for the validity of Social Action? In the general model, especially as first formulated in Mental Development, Baldwin followed Spencer and Bain in relying on “the pleasure or pain of maintaining contact with a stimulus” to provide a criterion of adaptive success. An adaptive variation in action was one that continued or increased pleasure and avoided pain. For the new social model elaborated in Social and Ethical Interpretations, this criterion was clearly inadequate; and for it Baldwin therefore substituted Social Confirmation. Social Confirmation is a change in Social Suggestion as a result of and reflecting the nature of Social Action. When the child smiles and her smile is returned, when she holds out an object to be taken and her companion takes it from her, or when she makes a statement and receives a nod of agreement, she is receiving Social Confirmation, evidence of the success (or in some instances failure) of her Social Action.
Yet if Baldwin had stopped here, something critical would have still been missing from the model. Social Suggestions, Social Actions and Social Confirmations do not take place in a vacuum. Rather they exist in a broader social context from which they receive their cultural meaning. Baldwin calls this context “Social Heredity.” Social Heredity is, he says, “the mass of organized tradition, custom, usage, social habit…already embodied in the institutions and ways of acting, thinking…of a given social group, considered as the normal heritage of the individual social child.”49 Social Heredity is, in effect, the system of social meanings into which the child is born and to which the child must become enculturated. It is the means by which the infant becomes progressively more adapted to society, progressively more like-minded with those around him. It was this idea, among others, that significantly influenced the thinking of Vygotsky; and through Vygotsky it has also finally taken root in modern developmental psychology.50
Finally, with this as background, it is possible to clarify a theoretical conception at the heart of Social and Ethical Interpretations – that of the microgenesis of the social self or, as Baldwin often termed it, the “dialectic of personal growth.” The dialectic of personal growth is simply another name for the operation of Baldwin’s model of social adaptation in the acquisition of the child’s Social Thought of the Self.
Initially, the child is confronted with a novel element of Social Suggestion, an element that is not in the child’s repertoire. Someone, in other words, does or says something that the child cannot herself do or say. This Baldwin calls a “Project.” When over time Habit becomes progressively accommodated to this novelty through Imitation/ Invention (i.e., through Social Action), what used to be novel now becomes part of the child’s social repertoire. What was “Projective” is now “Subjective”, that is, part of the child’s own thought of herself. But, and here is the key, no sooner is a previously novel element part of the Habit system than it becomes available to give meaning to Social Thought in the assimilation to Habit of Social Suggestion from the other. The child’s thought of the other is then, as Baldwin liked to say, “filled up” with her thought of herself. This is the Ejective or Social Self. As Baldwin summarizes it in Social and Ethical Interpretations, “the child’s subjective sense goes out by a sort of return dialectic to illuminate the other…the ‘project’ of the earlier period is now lighted up, claimed, clothed on with the raiment of selfhood…and the ejective or social self, is born.”51
There is much more that could be said about Social and Ethical Interpretations. Among other things, it includes a description of Baldwin’s four stages of development, stages that are defined not in terms of structure, as were those of the later Piaget, but in terms of newly emergent psychological processes, especially imitation, reflection, and synthesis. And it contains Baldwin’s theory of the development of morality, of the ideal ethical self as a higher synthesis of egoistic thought of self and altruistic thought of other. Indeed, this remarkable book offers a great deal to anyone concerned with the complexities of human social development.
As Baldwin was elaborating the social implications of his evolutionary concepts, he was also engaged in extending these concepts, particularly those related to the principle of organic selection. In the May–June, 1896, issue of the American Naturalist, Baldwin (1896c) announced the outcome of this thinking as a hypothesis for which he borrowed the term “organic selection” that he had already introduced for individual adaptation; and between 1896 and 1900 he published a series of related articles on the relationship between heredity and instinct, the place of consciousness in evolution, the nature of physical and social heredity, and the concepts of determinate evolution, isolation and selection.52 In 1902, this material was pulled together, revised, and published as Development and Evolution,53 a book that Baldwin always considered the third volume in his mental development series.
In Development and Evolution, Baldwin had finally arrived at a clear conception of the mechanism mediating the influence of individual adaptations on the course of phylogenetic evolution. As he described it in an autobiographical chapter written toward the end of his life, the theory of organic selection involved the claim that:
natural selection operating on “spontaneous variations” is sufficient alone to produce determinate evolution (without the inheritance of acquired adaptations or modifications), since – and this is the new point – in each generation variations in the direction of, or “coincident” with, the function to be developed will favor the organisms possessing them, and their descendants will profit by the accumulation of such variations. Thus the function will gradually come to perfection. In other words, the individual organism’s accommodations, made through learning, effort, adaptation, etc., while not physically inherited, still act to supplement or screen the congenital endowment during its incomplete stages, and so give the species time to build up its variations in determinate lines.54
Paradoxically, just as Baldwin was producing his most important psychological work, providing in his evolutionary psychology what may be the only adequate basis for the integration of rationalism and empiricism, he was beginning to abandon the field for philosophy. By 1897 involvement in experimental work had virtually ceased. Instead Baldwin entered yet another period of intense intellectual development, a period of transformation away from experimentation and toward philosophical psychology. This period would ultimately produce yet another radically restructured conception, an evolutionary epistemology.
Princeton: Period of Transition, 1897–1903. A number of factors contributed to Baldwin’s intellectual growth during this period. One such factor was his growing awareness of the conflict between the methodological demands of his evolutionary views and the available empirical methods of experimental psychology. An evolutionary psychology required new methods. As Baldwin later stated the problem:
How can the development of the mental order of phenomena – or that of any other truly genetic order, involving progress – be fruitfully investigated? The…quantitative method, brought over into psychology from the exact sciences…must be discarded; for its ideal consisted in reducing the more complex to the more simple, the whole to its parts, the later-evolved to the earlier-existent, thus denying or eliminating just the factor which constituted or revealed what was truly genetic… . A method is therefore called for which will take account of this something left ‘over and above’ the quantitative, something which presents new phases as the genetic progression advances.55
Unfortunately Baldwin had no such method. In pursuit of a synthesis between mental philosophy and the new experimental psychology, he had arrived at a novel conception that transcended both. He had replaced intuitionalism with a biological theory of mind; but the empirical issues raised by his new theory could not be adequately addressed with the experimental methods of the new psychology. Baldwin’s ideas had far outstripped the scientific methodology of his day.
It is of small wonder, then, that having achieved the evolutionary insight, Baldwin found little of relevance to his theoretical concerns in the experimentalism of the period. As he later reported:
The experimental vein was worked, though with lessening interest, for the ten years of my stay at Princeton…Already at Princeton the new interest in genetic psychology and general biology had become absorbing, and the meagerness of the results of the psychological laboratories (apart from direct work on sensation and movement) was becoming evident everywhere. I began to feel that there was truth in what James was already proclaiming as to the barrenness of the tables and curves coming from many laboratories.56
Baldwin’s biological theory of the developing coordination of reason with reality had naturally led him to a point in his career where the only method of investigation open to him was the logical method of philosophical analysis.
A second factor contributing to Baldwin’s intellectual growth during this period of transition was a general resurgence of interest in epistemological issues in American philosophy. As he described the situation:
In the late nineties there was a return in America to problems of an epistemological character. It gave rise to a re-examination of the psychological bases of philosophy…Truth, error, the method and validity of knowledge became topics of real vitality, and instrumental and pragmatic theories of many varieties saw the light.
From the side of evolution theory, the futility of the older views, which made of thinking an absolute faculty and of truth a sort of psychograph of reality, was evident. The theory of adaptation saw in the rise of thinking a critical turn in the evolution of mind. Knowledge became a function of prime genetic significance, an instrument of supreme utility.57
In his presidential address to the 1897 meeting of the American Psychological Association, Baldwin presented his first substantive contribution to the new discussions in epistemology.58 Extending the variation with selection theme to thinking, Baldwin argued, as he later described it, that “the discovery of truth…[is] an adaptation to a given set of data, proceeding by a series of tentative selections from variations of imagery and fragments of hypothetical value.”59 Thinking is both the means of adaptive action in the individual’s environment of objects, persons, and beliefs and an instrument of the expansion and clarification of the social system of knowledge in science and culture. The validity of this knowledge is, of course, guaranteed by selection:
Truth is what is selected under the control of the system of established thoughts and facts, and assimilated to the body of socially acquired knowledges and beliefs. Truth thus becomes a tentative and slowly-expanding body of data, more or less adequately reflecting the stable whole of thought and action which is accepted as reality, and in turn enlarging and clarifying that whole.60
Though compatible with the early versions of pragmatism, this interactive instrumentalist view “stopped short…of the pure relativism and subjectivism of many pragmatic writers, inasmuch as it holds that… knowledge presupposes a dualism of controls: the agent, on the one hand, and the recognized world of truth and reality…on the other.”61
Finally, a third and perhaps most important factor in rekindling Baldwin’s interest in philosophy and in the emergence of his evolutionary epistemology was his activity as editor of the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.62 As Baldwin described the rationale for the project:
At an early day, I was impressed by the difficulty of profitable discussion in the newer branches of psychology, by reason of the paucity and ambiguity of the terms in use…there were many in America, among them notably C. S. Peirce, advocating his views in the New York Nation, who proposed to cut loose entirely from popular usage and coin a clear and consistent terminology for the mental and moral sciences as had been done for mathematics and symbolic logic. While not going the whole way with the latter, I was convinced that confusion lurked in most of the discussions of the day, from the lack of well-defined terms…As a step toward reform and common understanding in the matter, the project of…a dictionary or cyclopedia, took form.63
First announced at the end of 1896, the Dictionary had begun, by 1898, to usurp the majority of Baldwin’s time as he dealt with the “complications…tribulations…[and] mountainous mole-hills”64 attending its preparation. In the fall of 1899, Baldwin took a leave of absence from Princeton to travel to Oxford to supervise the Dictionary’s completion and by 1902, the first two volumes had been published.65
The impact of this activity on Baldwin’s thinking was inestimable. The Dictionary involved as authors many of the greatest minds of the day. William James, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce, G. E. Moore, Bernard Bosanquet, James McKeen Cattell, Edward B. Titchener, Hugo Münsterberg, Christine Ladd-Franklin, Adolf Meyer, George Frederick Stout, Franklin H. Giddings, and E. B. Poulton, among others, were involved in a project whose goal was to provide a systematic definition for every major concept in philosophy and psychology. As the general editor of this monumental compilation, Baldwin found himself atop a mountain of information relevant to practically every major issue in the philosophical domain. Every article received Baldwin’s personal attention; and for a time at least every author became Baldwin’s regular correspondent.
The effect of this extraordinary intellectual undertaking on the nature and direction of Baldwin’s work was immediately apparent. His first deep appreciation of Hegel, an increasingly broad reference to the philosophical work of Lotze, an acquaintance with the thought of Meinong, and a deep interest in the nature and development of logic all date from the period immediately following the Dictionary’s publication. After 1902, the content and method of Baldwin’s work was almost entirely philosophical.
Baltimore, 1903–1908. In 1903, Baldwin resigned his position at Princeton to become Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Johns Hopkins. There he founded another major journal, the Psychological Bulletin, and began work on Thought and Things…or Genetic Logic,66 a four-volume analysis of the development of cognition and experience. The first volume focused on pre-logical thought, imagery, memory, play, and the rise of meaning. The second volume analyzed discursive thought, reflection, the development of logical meaning, and implication. The third volume discussed “hyper-logical” operations; and the final volume, Genetic Theory of Reality, brought the work of the three prior volumes together in a final synthesis focused on the analysis of aesthetic experience or, as Baldwin preferred to call it, pancalism.
As always, Baldwin is engaged in the continuing struggle to comprehend the coordination of reason and reality, thought and things. As he put it:
I find that these dualisms are of a certain first-hand and unreflective crudeness in the epochs before the rise of Judgment and Reflection, and that they cannot be finally resolved by the “practical” methods of that epoch, as is claimed by Instrumentalism or Pragmatism; that they are given refined and characteristic form when melted up and re-cast in the dualism of Reflection, that of Self and Not-self, or Subject and Object. Yet Thought as such, Reflection, cannot resolve its own Dualisms; Rationalism is as helpless before the final problem of the meaning of Reality as is the cruder Pragmatism.67
And, for Baldwin, that final synthesis is to be found:
…in a form of contemplation, Aesthetic in character…[in which] the immediacy of experience constantly seeks to re-establish itself. In the highest form of such contemplation, a form which comes to itself as genuine and profound Aesthetic Experience, we find a synthesis of motives, a mode in which the strands of the earlier and diverging dualisms are merged and fused. In this experience of a fusion which is not a mixture, but which issues in a meaning of its own sort and kind, an experience whose essential character is just its unity of comprehension, consciousness has its completest and most direct and final apprehension of what reality is and means.68
Dense, conceptually difficult, encumbered by an unrestrained tendency to neologism, and appearing when psychology was struggling to free itself from philosophy, Thought and Things was little read and less appreciated. Yet it represents, in some fundamental sense, the telos of Baldwin’s intellectual development. From mental philosophy to evolutionary psychology to evolutionary epistemology, Baldwin was constantly in search of an integrative balance between epistemological extremes. For Baldwin, the oppositions of biology and culture, the individual and society, thought and action, and truth and value have their roots, one and all, in the developing coordination of reason and reality. This coordination, in its progressive elaboration, first generates and then overcomes the dichotomies between mind and body, subject and object, and reality and appearance, finding its final issue in aesthetic experience, in a “pancalism.” This was the endpoint of Baldwin’s own intellectual development; and in his view, it was one of his most important contributions to human thought.69
Mexico and France, 1908–1912. In the midst of this work, disaster struck. In 1908, at the pinnacle of his career, Baldwin was arrested in a raid on a Baltimore bordello and forced to resign from Hopkins. The ensuing scandal led to his being ostracized from American psychology and to his eventual decision to become an expatriate. Between 1908 and 1912, Baldwin divided his time between Mexico, advising on university organization and lecturing in the School of Higher Studies at the National University in Mexico City, and residence in Paris.
While in Mexico, Baldwin worked on two of his final contributions to psychology. Darwin and the Humanities,70 which appeared in 1909, began as an invited address for the Darwin Anniversary Meeting of the American Philosophical Society to be held in Philadelphia, a meeting which Baldwin was ultimately unable to attend.71 Concentrating particularly on Darwin’s human studies, his “Biographical Sketch of an Infant,” his analysis of the nature and origin of the moral sense in the Descent of Man, and his views on instinct, Baldwin attempted to show how the theory of natural selection could be extended to important issues in psychology, ethics, logic, philosophy, and religion, especially through the application of his own principle of organic selection.
The Individual and Society,72 published in 1911, was based on a course of lectures that Baldwin delivered in the National University of Mexico in 1910. In these lectures, Baldwin argues for a psychological (as against sociological) analysis of the nature of the social bond, the “rules of organization…which characterize the personal development of minds in relation to one another…[and] the inner development of the social life within the group.”73 Topics include social solidarity and community, competition, individualism, the nature of social institutions, and social invention and progress.
In 1912, Baldwin made his fourth and final visit to Mexico. During the period of his lectureship, the Mexican political situation degenerated and, as Americans were increasingly becoming targets of hostility, he left in the Fall of 1912 to return to France.
Paris, 1912–1934. After the outbreak of World War I, Baldwin devoted himself to urging American entry into the war on the side of the Allies. In 1916 he authored a “Message from Americans Abroad to Americans at Home” that was widely circulated by the American Rights League, published American Neutrality, Its Cause and Cure,74 and delivered the Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford – a pointed attack on German political ideology.75 In that same year, Baldwin also survived a German torpedo attack on the French passenger ship Sussex as it was crossing the English channel and his open telegram to the President of the United States regarding the affair was embodied in the New York Times’s editorial condemnation of the attack.76
Throughout the war, Baldwin worked diligently in a variety of charity and relief efforts mounted on behalf of the French people. In 1917, he was decorated for this work with the Legion of Honor. With American entry into the war, he helped organize a Paris branch of the American Navy League, serving as its Chairman until 1922. After the Armistice, he maintained informal academic contacts and spent time in preparation of his memoirs. These were published in 1926 as Between Two Wars (1861–1921).77 He died in Paris on 9 November 1934.
1 Boring, E. G. (1929). A History of Experimental Psychology.
New York: Century,
2 Baldwin, J. M. (1926). Between Two Wars (1861–1921). Being Memories, Opinions, and Letters Received. Boston: Stratford (2 vols.), pp. 1–18.
3 For further information on McCosh, see: Hoeveler, J. D. (1981). James McCosh and the Scottish Intellectual Tradition: From Glasgow to Princeton. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4 McCosh, J. (1872). The Intuitions of the Mind, Inductively Investigated (3rd rev. edition). New York: Carter, p. 17.
6 For a valuable discussion of this issue, see Maier, B. N. (2000). Apart from Revelation: The Separation of Psychology and Theology at Princeton College, 1868–1903. Doctoral Dissertation, Wheaton College.
7 See Baldwin (1926), op. cit., p. 32.
9 For information on Paulsen, see: Paulsen, F. (1938). Friedrich Paulsen. An Autobiography. New York: Columbia University Press.
10 Baldwin, J. M. (1889a). The idealism of Spinoza. Presbyterian Review 10 (37), 65–76; a slightly revised version appears in Baldwin, J. M. (1902a). Fragments in Philosophy and Science. Being Collected Essays and Addresses. New York: Scribner’s, pp. 24–41.
11 Baldwin (1926), op. cit., p. 12.
12 Baldwin (1889a), op. cit., p. 75.
13 Ribot, T. (1886). German Psychology of To-day. The Empirical School. New York: Scribner’s.
14 Baldwin, J. M. (1887). The postulates of a physiological psychology. Presbyterian Review 8, 427–41; a slightly revised version appears in Baldwin (1902a), op. cit., pp. 139–58.
15 Ibid., p. 428.
16 Ibid., pp. 428–33.
17 Baldwin, J. M. (1890). Recent discussion in materialism. Presbyterian and Reformed Review 1 (3), 357–72; a slightly revised version appears in Baldwin (1902a), op. cit., pp. 42–61.
18 Baldwin, J. M. (1889b). Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect. New York: Holt.
19 Ibid., p. 324.
20 Baldwin, J. M. (1894). The origin of right-handedness. Popular Science Monthly 44, 606–15.
21 Ibid., pp. 606–607.
22 Baldwin, J. M. (1891a). Handbook of Psychology: Feeling and Will. New York: Holt.
23 Ibid., p. 23.
24 Baldwin (1926), op. cit., p. 48.
25 Bernheim, H. (1884). De la suggestion dans l’état hypnotique et dans l’état de veille. Paris: Doin.
26 Baldwin, J. M. (1895). Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and Processes. New York: Macmillan, p. vii.
29 Spencer, H. (1855). The Principles of Psychology. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans; Bain, A. (1855). The Senses and the Intellect. London: Parker. Both of these works went through a number of revisions and multiple printings. It is likely that Baldwin read them in editions that appeared in the 1880s.
30 Baldwin (1895), op. cit.
31 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
32 Ibid., p. 27.
33 As indicated by alterations in the text and footnotes, Baldwin’s view of recapitulationism changed over successive editions of Mental Development. The view described here is that of the first edition of 1895.
34 Baldwin (1895), op. cit., p. 15.
35 Ibid., p. 26.
36 Ibid., p. 166.
37 Ibid., p. 170.
38 Ibid., p. 133.
39 Ibid., p. 174.
40 While the term “organic selection” first appeared in Mental Development with reference to the ontogenetic mechanism described in the text, Baldwin later extended and then ultimately limited the term to the broader phylogenetic process that came to be known as the “Baldwin effect.” For a fascinating analysis of this issue, see Richards (1987). Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; also see Braestrup (1971). The evolutionary significance of learning. Videnskabelige Meddelelser Dansk Naturhistorisk Forening 134, 89–102.
41 Baldwin (1895), op. cit., p. 204.
42 See Richards (1987), op. cit.
43 Baldwin (1895), op. cit., p. 205.
44 Piaget, J. (1936). La Naissance de l’intelligence chez l’enfant. Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestlé.
45 Ibid., p. ix.
46 Baldwin, J. M. (1930). James Mark Baldwin. In C. Murchison (ed.). A History of Psychology in Autobiography. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, pp. 1–30. Quotation is on p. 4.
47 Baldwin, J. M. (1897). Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development. A Study in Social Psychology. New York: Macmillan.
48 Piaget (1936), op. cit.
49 Baldwin (1897), op. cit., p. 301.
50 For an excellent discussion of this aspect of Vygotsky’s theory, see van der Veer, R. & Valsiner, J. (1991). Understanding Vygotsky. A Quest for Synthesis. Oxford: Blackwell.
51 Baldwin (1897), op. cit., p. 8.
52 Baldwin, J. M. (1896a). Consciousness and evolution. Psychological Review 3, 300–309; Baldwin, J. M. (1896b). Heredity and instinct. Science 3, 438–41, 558–61; Baldwin, J. M. (1897b). Determinate evolution. Psychological Review 4, 393–401; Baldwin, J. M. & Cope, E. D. (1896). Physical and social heredity. American Naturalist 30, 422–30; and Baldwin, J. M., Hutton, F. W., & Williams, H. S. (1898). Isolation and selection. Science 7, 570–71, 637–40.
53 Baldwin, J. M. (1902b). Development and Evolution. Including Psychophysical Evolution, Evolution by Orthoplasy, and the Theory of Genetic Modes. New York: Macmillan.
54 Baldwin (1930), op. cit., p. 7.
55 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
56 Ibid., p. 4.
57 Ibid., p. 9.
58 Baldwin, J. M. (1898). On selective thinking. Psychological Review 5, 1–25.
59 Baldwin (1930), op. cit., p. 9.
60 Ibid., pp. 9–10.
61 Ibid., p. 10.
62 Baldwin, J. M. (1901–1905). Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Macmillan.
63 Baldwin (1930), op. cit., p. 26.
64 Baldwin (1926), op. cit., p. 72.
65 A third volume, containing an extensive “Bibliography of Philosophy and Psychology” compiled by Benjamin Rand, was published in 1905.
66 Baldwin, J. M. (1906). Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought. Or Genetic Logic. I. Functional Logic, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge. New York: Macmillan; Baldwin, J. M. (1908). Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought. Or Genetic Logic. II. Experimental Logic, or Genetic Theory of Thought. London: Swan Sonnenschein; Baldwin, J. M. (1911a). Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought. Or Genetic Logic. III. Interest and Art. Being Real Logic. I. Genetic Epistemology. London: George Allen; and Baldwin, J. M. (1915). Genetic Theory of Reality. Being the Outcome of Genetic Logic as Issuing in the Aesthetic Theory of Reality called Pancalism. New York: Putnam.
67 Baldwin (1906), op. cit., pp. ix–x.
68 Ibid., p. x.
69 See, for example, Baldwin (1930), op. cit., p. 30.
70 Baldwin, J. M. (1909). Darwin and the Humanities. Baltimore: Review Publishing Co.
71 See ibid., p. vii.
72 Baldwin, J. M. (1911b). The Individual and Society. Or Psychology and Sociology. Boston: Badger.
73 Ibid., p. 9.
74 Baldwin, J. M. (1916a). American Neutrality, Its Cause and Cure. New York: Putnam.
75 Baldwin, J. M. (1916b). The Superstate and the ‘Eternal Values.’ Being the Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on Wednesday, March 15, 1916. Oxford: University Press.
76 New York Times, 4 April 1916.
77 Baldwin (1930), op. cit.
Robert H. Wozniak (ed.), 'Introduction', Selected Works of James Mark Baldwin (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2001), pp. v- xxxi.
© Robert H. Wozniak, 2001.